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ILLEGAL PROCEDURE:

THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL

LEAGUE PLAYERS UNION'S IMPROPER USE OF
ANTITRUST LITIGATION FOR PURPOSES OF
.COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NEIL

K.

ROMAN*

On October 15, 1987, the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA" or "Union") ended its twenty-four day strike against
the National Football League ("NFL" or "League") and simultaneously
filed in federal district court in Minnesota an antitrust complaint against
the NFL and its twenty-eight member clubs.' Joined by nine-present or
former NFLPA officials on behalf of all NFL players, the Union's suit
challenges the League's system governing inter-team movement of veteran "free agent" players, 2 the annual college draft, the NFL player contract, and other employment terms. Each of these terms had been set
forth in at least two collective bargaining agreements, the most recent of
3
which had expired, with some notable exceptions, six weeks earlier.
From the beginning, the Powell litigation has constituted an improper attempt to involve the courts in a labor dispute and has been a
significant impediment to collective bargaining. When the Union
brought suit after only limited and sporadic efforts at bargaining, the
district court observed that the NFLPA was seeking "to gain through the
courts what they could not win at the bargaining table."' 4 When the district court ruled that the antitrust laws did not apply to the challenged
employment terms until such time as the parties reached an impasse in
negotiations, 5 the NFLPA declaredfor thefirst time that impasse had been
reached and thereafter refused to take any action - i.e., bargaining inconsistent with this position. And when the Eighth Circuit ruled that
the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws "protects agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship from
* Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1980, Bowdoin College;
J.D. 1985, Harvard University. I am grateful for the substantial assistance of Covington &
Burling colleagues John H. Schafer, Herbert Dym, Jeffrey Pash, and Richard Wm.
Buchanan.
1. Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-87-917 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 1987).
2. Veteran free agents are players whose contracts have expired.
3. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Management Council and the National Football League Players Association, art. XXXVIII,
§ 2 (Dec. I1,1982) [hereinafter 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement]. The most significant exception to the Agreement's general 1987 expiration date is for the provisions governing the college draft which continue "through at least 1992." 1982 Collective
Bargaining Agreement, art. XIII, § 1.
4. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 781 n.9 (D. Minn. 1988).
5. Id. at 788.
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[Sherman Act] challenges," 6 the NFLPA declined the court's invitation
to resume bargaining and instead announced plans to decertify and
abandon its bargaining rights. Indeed, at every turn, the Union has rejected bargaining or reliance on the labor laws in favor of its treble damage case.
At the heart of the dispute are the so-called "free agency" provisions. These provisions have their genesis in two collective bargaining
agreements - the 1977 and 1982 Agreements between the NFLPA and
the NFL Management Council, the collective bargaining representative
of the twenty-eight member clubs. Both agreements included versions
of a system governing the movement among NFL clubs of veteran players known as the "right of first refusal/compensation system."' 7 Under
this system, a club wishing to maintain contract rights with respect to
one of its veteran free agents is required to make a contract offer at a
specified salary level depending on the player's seniority. 8 If another
club then offers the player a contract, the former club has the option of
matching the offer and retaining rights to the player or receiving compensation from the signing club in the form of future draft choices, the
number and quality of which are to be determined by the player's salary
and seniority. 9 A substantially liberalized system implemented at the
start of the 1989 season permits each club to retain first refusal/compensation rights with respect to 37 of its approximately 55 players; the
rest are free to sign with any club without any first refusal or compensation rights. ' 0
Although the NFLPA has stated that its primary collective bargaining/litigation goal is "complete free agency" for every player, I I every
court that has addressed the issue has held that the NFL must have some
player reservation system to preserve and promote its "strong and
unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams."' 12
"[C]omplete freedom of movement," the Eighth Circuit has held,
"would result in the best franchises acquiring most of the top players,"
would have a potentially "devastating effect" on NFL clubs, would be
"irresponsible," and would "endanger the continued employment prospects of" the players. 1 3 In Powell, the district court on two occasions
denied motions to enjoin implementation of player reservation systems
in part because of "[tihe danger that destruction of the competitive balance could ultimately lead to diminished spectator interest and franchise
6. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-

1421 (Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library,'Courts file).
7. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XV.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
11. Garvey, Foreword to The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports: A Perspective
on Collective Bargainingin the NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 328, 329. The author of the foreword, Ed

Garvey, was the Executive Director of the NFLPA from 1970-83.
12.

See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.

801 (1977).
13.

See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280, 282, 287 (8th Cir. 1978).
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failures." 14
The NFL's system governing veteran player movement is an important element of an elaborate framework of rules and policies whose purpose is to maintain this competitive balance.1 5 Of those not involving
the allocation of players among teams, the most important is the clubs'
pooling of League revenues, including those from the League's national
television contracts.1 6 Because the NFL has clubs in cities of widely varying sizes and resources, the equal division of the majority of League
revenues allows clubs located in the smaller markets to compete effectively on the playing field with teams based in media centers. Nevertheless, in an earlier article published in the Duke Law Journal, Ethan Lock,
who is presenting his understanding of the NFLPA's position in this law
review, calls not only for the removal of restraints on veteran players,
but also for the elimination of the NFL's antitrust exemption for the
pooling of revenues and the League's internal rules restricting the
movement of franchises from one city to another. 1 7 Even Mr. Lock,
however, concedes that "the result might be a league with three
franchises in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago, and none in Kansas
18
City, Cincinnati, or Green Bay."'
Notwithstanding the restraints on movement,' 9 NFL players are
prospering. Their average salary has risen from $78,000 in 1980 to
more than $300,000 in 198920 with an additional $50-55,000 in collectively-bargained benefits. 2 ' At the top, contracts paying players in excess of $500,000 per year are common. 2 2 Although the best players
might be able to command still higher salaries if more teams were com14. See, e.g., Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988).
15. The annual college draft is another significant mechanism for ensuring that teams
have equal access to the best players while at the same time providing weaker teams an
opportunity to improve themselves. Through the draft, clubs secure rights to the top college players in inverse order of finish. The waiver system for players released by their
clubs operates in a similar fashion by giving clubs with the worst records the first opportunity to contract with players released by other clubs.
16. Other such policies include limits on roster size and a scheduling system that favors the weaker teams.
17. See Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339.
18. Id. at 407.
19. Although the NFLPA has attempted to characterize the issue as one of "freedom"
and "dignity," it is clear that the Union's demand for open bidding is motivated largely, if
not entirely, by monetary concerns. See, e.g., LeGere, Donlan, Upshaw Hope to Avoid Repeat of
'82, Pro Football Weekly, Nov. 7, 1986, at 5, col. 4 (quoting NFLPA Executive Director
Eugene Upshaw as follows: "When we're involved in something that generates as much
money as pro football does . . . and we don't take care of the players that built the game,
that's a mistake.").
20. See McDonough, NFL: They All Cashed In, Boston Globe, Dec. 24, 1989, at 46
(based on figures supplied by the NFLPA).
21. See Jones, Management Council Presents Its Side of the Story, Pro Football Weekly, Dec.
17, 1989 (letter to the editor by NFL Management Council's director of public relations).
22. In 1988, the average salary of each NFL team's top 12 players was $536,000, exceeding the NBA average for that League's 12-man rosters of $524,000. The 1988 NFL
average for each club's top 24 players was $408,000, which is only slightly less than Major
League Baseball's $431,000 average for its 24-man rosters. See NFL Management Council,
Top NFL Pay Comparable to NBA, Baseball Averages (Mar. 22, 1989) (unpublished news
release).
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peting for their services, their current compensation levels indicate that
they have significant leverage vis-a-vis their own club.
In fact, the growing disparity in compensation levels between the
"superstars" - generally "skill" position players such as quarterbacks
and wide receivers - and the so-called "journeymen" players who dominate NFL rosters2 3 raises the question as to the division among players
of the large but finite pool of funds available to each club for player
costs. Indeed, Mr. Garvey, who preceded Eugene Upshaw as Executive
Director of the NFLPA, has been openly critical of the NFLPA's recent
pursuit of greater opportunities for movement for the top players at the
expense of improved benefits for all players: "My view is that the union
should deemphasize free agency and refocus on agreement over a fixed
percentage of gross revenues."124 Mr. Garvey's view is apparently
shared by many active players; a recent independent poll revealed that
only nineteen percent of the players surveyed listed free agency as their
compared to sevfirst priority in a new collective bargaining agreement
25
enty-two percent favoring improved benefits.
Accordingly, not only does this position paper argue from a legal
standpoint that the Eighth Circuit's opinion represents a proper accommodation of labor and antitrust principles, but it also contends that the
players have been disserved by the NFLPA's decision to resort to the
courts. Indeed, after nearly three years of divisive and costly litigation
in both the district court and the Eighth Circuit, the players are still
without an agreement and have missed opportunities for increases in
compensation and benefits. The history of this dispute therefore confirms that courts are ill-suited to resolve labor disputes and that a bargained resolution is in the best interests of all concerned - the players,
the clubs, and the fans.
I.

SUMMARY

At the outset, it is important to understand what is not at issue in
Powell. Indeed, the Powell plaintiffs have never so much as alleged that
the challenged player restraints affect business competition in any product market, that these restraints have been imposed outside the collective
bargaining process, or that the NFL defendants have at any time failed
23.

Mr. Garvey, in his foreword to Mr. Lock's Duke Law Journalarticle, estimates that

"non-star players . . .make up about 96% of the Union." Garvey, supra note 11, at 338.
24. Id. at 336. More recently, Mr. Garvey stated his opposition to the NFLPA's announced plans to decertify in light of the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Powell. See infra notes
87-88 and accompanying text. According to Mr. Garvey, if the NFLPA goes "through with
decertification, all that will happen is that they will make some quarterbacks and superstars
a lot richer. There should be more concern for a Darryl Stingley" (a former player who is

paralyzed for life). McDonough, Idea Put Garvey Ahead of His Time, Boston Globe, Dec. 31,
1989, at 50. Mr. Garvey added that, "[tihis free agency the players are looking for is mythical. All players do not benefit from free agency." Id.
25. See King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 30, 1989, at 66, cols. 2-3. An

additional five percent urged increased roster sizes and improved working conditions and
four percent expressed no opinion. Indeed, one possible explanation for the failure of the
NFLPA's strike in 1987 is the Union's inability to identify a strike issue of common interest
to the majority of its members.
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to bargain in good faith. To the contrary, the challenged restraints concern mandatory subjects of bargaining which relate only to a labor market involving the parties to a collective bargaining relationship and are
the product of a negotiation process in which management has at all
times abided by its labor law obligations.
In circumstances closely analogous to these, every appellate court
to have addressed the issue has concluded that the labor, not the antitrust, laws are exclusively to govern the dispute. 2 6 Those courts have
uniformly recognized that the labor laws are uniquely suited for the resolution of employment-related disputes having no external effects on
business competition. As Professor Cox put it, -[n]o one seriously suggests that antitrust policy should be concerned with the labor market per
27
se."
Of these governing labor law principles, perhaps the most fundamental is freedom of contract. Under the labor laws, courts are expressly forbidden from dictating or even influencing the
substantive terms of labor-management agreements. 28 Instead, they are
to monitor the use by the parties of approved economic weapons as a
means to persuade the other side to reach a compromise. Among the
primary weapons in union arsenals is the right to engage in concerted
activity such as striking 2 9 and picketing.3 0 Employers may, in turn, lock
out their employees 3 ' or, in certain circumstances, hire permanent
replacements. 3 2 At least one court has recognized that this freedom of
contract principle applies with unique force in the professional sports
context because "[s]uch bargaining relationships raise numerous
33
problems with little or no precedent in standard industrial relations."
In view of the delicately balanced framework established by the labor laws for the resolution of labor disputes, no judge - not even the
Powell dissenter - has ever suggested that the labor exemption does not
"survive" formal expiration of a collective bargaining agreement.3 4
26. See, e.g., Mid-America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist.
Council, 675 F.2d 881, 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters Local Union No. 576 v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979);
Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 431 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co., 319
F.2d 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
27. See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws -A

Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252,

254 (1955).
28. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-09 (1970) ("[I]t is the job of
Congress, not the [National Labor Relations] Board or the courts, to decide when and if it
is necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective-bargaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side's demands."); NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483-87 (1960) ("Congress was generally not concerned with the
substantive terms on which the parties contracted.").
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982); see also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S.
9 (1962).
30. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
31. See, e.g., American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
33. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).
34. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1989) (majority); id. at 569 n.4
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Nevertheless, Mr. Lock in his Duke Law Journal article had encouraged
the Eighth Circuit to adopt this contrary rule withdrawing immunity
upon contract expiration. 3 5 Every court to have addressed the issue,
however, has recognized that such a rule would completely upset the
balance outlined in the labor laws and would drastically alter the bargaining positions of the parties.
Therefore, the true issue presented in Powell is not whether the labor exemption "survives" contract expiration, but rather for how long.
The district court concluded that impasse marks the proper endpoint
because at impasse the employer is free to implement new employment
terms consistent with past offers. 36 The Eighth Circuit, however, observed that the Supreme Court has defined "impasse" as merely "a temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations ' 3 7 which "may be 'brought
about intentionally by one or both parties as a device to further, rather
than destroy, the bargaining process.' "38 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the impasse standard "treats a lawful stage of the
collective bargaining process as misconduct by defendants, and in this
way conflicts with federal labor laws that establish the collective bargain39
ing process."1
The Eighth Circuit held that a proper accommodation of labor and
antitrust doctrine requires that the labor exemption protect all agreements "conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship. "40
Under this standard, terms of employment remain exempt from antitrust challenge where the employer satisfies its obligations under the labor laws, including the duty to bargain in good faith. Indeed, the court
made clear that it was not holding that "management is forever exempt
from the antitrust laws, [or] . . . that restraints on player services can

41
never offend the Sherman Act."
At the end of its opinion, the Eighth Circuit outlined the parties'
options: "They may bargain further, which we would strongly urge that
they do. They may resort to economic force. And finally, if appropriate
issues arise, they may present claims to the National Labor Relations
Board."'42 Although these are the same options available to every other
union in every other industry in the country, the NFLPA chose another
course. On November 6, 1989, less than one week after the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling, Mr. Upshaw sent a letter to John M. Donlan, Executive Director of the NFL Management Council, stating that the Union's
Executive Committee had voted to "abandon bargaining rights and be-

(dissent); Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 785 (D. Minn. 1988); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675
F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987).
35. See Lock, supra note 17, at 374.
36. See Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788.
37. See Powell, 888 F.2d at 564 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v.
NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 566.
40. Id. at 568.
4 1.1d.
42. Id.
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gin the decertification process."'43 The letter indicates that this decision
had been prompted by the Eighth Circuit ruling and that its only intended purpose was to terminate the labor exemption and thereby revive the Union's antitrust suit.
This announced intention to decertify is therefore entirely consistent with the position of the NFLPA - and Mr. Lock4 4 - that a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached with the NFL member clubs unless
the Union has the threat of a treble damages action in its bargaining
arsenal. Ironically, however, throughout proceedings in the district
court in Powell, the NFLPA cited the system governing player movement
in Major League Baseball as an example of a less restrictive alternative
that should be adopted by the NFL. Major League Baseball, however,
has from the beginning enjoyed a complete antitrust immunity, 45 and the
baseball union therefore does not have access to the "antitrust lever.' '46
The lesson to be learned is that the labor laws provide associations of
professional athletes with all the weapons necessary to negotiate a set47
tlement fair to all parties.
II.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING -

AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION -

IN THE

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE

A.

Background

Prior to 1977, the system governing movement of veteran players
from one NFL club to another - known at the time as the "Rozelle
Rule" after former Commissioner Pete Rozelle - required any club that
48
If
signed a veteran free agent to compensate the player's former team.
the two clubs were unable to come to terms as to appropriate compensation, the Commissioner in his discretion was to award players, draft
49
choices, or both.
In 1975, a group of players challenged the Rozelle Rule under the
antitrust laws in Mackey v. National Football League. 50 Following a fiftyfive day trial, the district court ruled that the Rozelle Rule constituted a
concerted refusal to deal and was therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Act; the court also held that it was invalid under the rule of reason.
43. Letter from Mr. Upshaw to Mr. Donlan (Nov. 6, 1989).
44. See Lock, supra note 17, at 399 ("[Albsent the risk of antitrust liability, the owners
will have no incentive to bargain with the union over the restrictions on free agency.").
45. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
46. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 571 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
47. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Although this spring's lockout in Major League Baseball was marked by acrimonious and sometimes petty disputes, it was ended in one month in time to play an entire 162game schedule, and the Major League Baseball Players Association is generally considered
to have acquitted itself quite well. SeeJustice, Labor Process Wasn't Pretty, but It Worked Pretty
Well, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 1990, at B5, col. i.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit set forth a three-part test for application
of the labor exemption: the restraint (1) primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship; (2) concerns a mandatory
subject of bargaining; and (3) is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining.5" Although the appellate court found that the first two requirements had been satisfied, it held that the Rozelle Rule had not
been the subject of arm's-length bargaining and therefore did not qualify for the exemption. 52 Next, the court of appeals reversed the district
court finding of a per se violation of the antitrust laws in light of "the
unique nature of the business of professional football," i.e., the economic interdependence of the NFL clubs. 53 Finally, the court affirmed
the district court's rule of reason finding insofar as it concluded that the
Rozelle Rule was too restrictive, but it expressly recognized that the
NFL has a "strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams" and that collective bargaining is the best means
for achieving a proper balance between competing interests of players
54
and clubs.
Following the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Mackey, the NFL Management Council and the NFLPA resumed negotiations. By early 1977, the
parties had both settled the Mackey and Alexander 5 5 cases and executed a
five-year collective bargaining agreement 5 6 that included a new "right of
first refusal/compensation" system governing veteran player movement.
This system represented a significant change from the Rozelle Rule,
eliminating the role of the Commissioner and establishing non-discretionary guidelines under which a player's old club had the option of
either matching a competing offer from another club or receiving compensation in the form of draft choices from the new club. The 1977
upon court approval
Collective Bargaining Agreement was contingent
57
of the Alexander class action settlement.
The Alexander settlement was in fact challenged by sixteen NFL players whose principal objection was to the inclusion of any restrictions on
player movement. The objectors' claims were rejected by the district
court which, after detailed review of the 1977 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, concluded that it "fundamentally modifies the traditional
51.

See id. at 614.

52.

The Eighth Circuit expressly reserved the question of the "survival" of the labor

exemption. Id. at 616 n.18.
53. Id. at 619.
54. Id. at 620-23.
55. Alexander v. NFL, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd sub.
nor. Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978). After the district court's decision in
Mackey, a class of all NFL players brought a parallel action challenging the same League
practices that had been at issue in Mackey.
56. 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Players Association and the National Football League Management Council (Mar. 1, 1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement].
57. See Id. at art. XXXVI, § 3. That settlement provided for payments to class members totalling $13,675,000 over a 10-year period. Appendix D to 1977 Agreement. In
addition, the parties agreed to the dismissal of Mackey, including the withdrawal of the
pending petition for certiorari, in consideration of settlement payments totalling
$2,200,000. Alexander, 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,992.
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form of [the] Rozelle Rule . . .[,J the college player draft, the option
clause in the NFL player contract, and related practices."15 8 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, observing that "the subject of player movement restrictions is a proper one for resolution in the collective bargaining
59
context."
B.

The 1982 Collective BargainingAgreement

The 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, with some exceptions,
expired before the start of the 1982 season. 60 After playing the first two
weeks of the 1982 season without a new collective bargaining agreement, the players went on strike over their demand for a fixed percentage of the NFL's gross revenues. 6 1 The strike resulted in the
cancellation of nearly half of that year's games and placed the entire
season in jeopardy. When a new collective bargaining agreement was
reached fifty-seven days later, it marked the end of the longest and cost62
liest work stoppage in the history of any professional sports league.
For the players, the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement promised a swift and dramatic increase in compensation. The total package
of benefits won by the NFLPA was substantial, with financial commitments by the NFL clubs in excess of $1.2 billion over the five seasons
covered by the Agreement. 63 Indeed, average player salaries, including
bonuses but excluding collectively-bargained benefits, rose during the
4
term of the agreement from $137,000 in 1983 to $241,000 in 1987.6
The principal concession made by the NFLPA in exchange for these financial commitments was the retention of a modified right of first refusal/compensation system, and it is clear that the Union did so with the
58. Alexander, 1977-2 Trade Cas. at 72,997-98. The district court further observed
that "[t]he NFLPA believes that the [liberalized compensation rule] will benefit the overwhelming majority of the players in the NFL and will raise salaries throughout the
League." Id. at 72,999.
59. See Reynolds, 584 F.2d at 289.
60. See 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 56, at art. XXVI, § 2.
61. In 1982, the NFLPA sought a minimum guarantee of 55% of annual league gross
income for player salaries (including bonuses, incentives, and post-season pay) and severance. Salary costs attributable to individually negotiated salaries above the 55% minimum, and the value of pension, insurance, and other aspects of the player benefit package,
were excluded from the Union's 55% demand. See generally, Wallace, N.F.L. and Players
Begin to Negotiate Contract Tomorrow, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1982, at C5, col. i. As Mr. Garvey
observes, the NFL estimates that players are currently receiving 65% of the gross and the
NFLPA acknowledges that players are "getting at least 55%." Garvey, supra note 11, at
336 & n.34.
62. Barnes, Agreement Reached in NFL Strike, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1982, at AI, col. 6.
63. Included among the benefits was a lump sum payment to be made under a
"Money Now" provision to all players on NFL rosters at the start of the strike. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XXIII.
64. See Affidavit of John M. Donlan (June 7, 1988) at 10-11. Undoubtedly, these
figures were influenced by the presence of a rival league, the United States Football
League ("USFL"), during the 1983-85 seasons. During this period, player salaries were
artificially raised by a bidding war that simply could not be sustained on a long-term basis,
as evidenced by the USFL's decision to cease operations. See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d
1335, 1351-52 (2d Cir. 1988). In any event, NFL player salaries have not retreated from
the levels reached during the USFL years and, in fact, have continued to increase steadily.
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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knowledge that inter-club movement of players under this system 6 5
would be limited as it had been under the 1977 Collective Bargaining
66
Agreement.
Despite the agreement to maintain the first refusal/compensation
system, the NFLPA in its first report to its members after the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement had been reached proclaimed that it had
"won" the strike: "The NFLPA has clearly established itself as a strong
union, one that staged a long and difficult strike, achieved major gains,
and survived intact." ' 6 7 The report further noted that subsequent negotiations would be conducted in an atmosphere in which the NFL Management Council will "know that the players are fully capable of shutting
down the regular season and inflicting enormous economic losses on the
68
owners."
C.

The 1987 Negotiations

Not surprisingly, the NFLPA's bargaining strategy heading into the
1987 negotiations was shaped largely by the 1982 experience. Outwardly confident that the NFL feared a repeat of the crippling 1982
strike, the NFLPA waited until early September 1987 - after the general expiration date of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement before assigning a monetary value to its demands. 6 9 One week later,
when the NFL Management Council refused to agree to the NFLPA's
demand for unrestricted free agency, the NFLPA initiated its strike - as
in 1982 - after the second weekend of regular season games.
This time, however, the clubs attempted to avoid being shut down
in mid-season again. Alerted earlier to the possibility of a strike, the
League suspended play just one week before resuming the regular sea65. Although there has been limited movement under the first refusal/compensation
system, a significant number of players change teams during the course of their careers
primarily through trades and the waiver system. Indeed, some players, such as running
back Eric Dickerson and quarterback John Elway, have sufficient leverage to demand
trades to certain clubs after threatening to withhold their services. Dickerson successfully
demanded to be traded from the Los Angeles Rams after that club refused to renegotiate
his contract, to the Indianapolis Colts, which agreed to increase his salary. Eskenazi, Dickerson Traded to Colts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1987, § 5, at 1, col. 6. Similarly, John Elway in
1983 refused to join the Baltimore Colts, which had acquired rights to him through the
college draft, and forced a trade to the Denver Broncos. Janofsky, Elway Traded to Broncos
by Colts, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983, at B5, col. 3.
66. Even though little movement had been contemplated by either party at the time of
the 1977 or 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreements, Mr. Lock now cites the lack of movement as evidence of a group boycott. Lock, supra note 17, at 346-47. The NFLPA, however, agreed in 1982 to maintenance of a system that had produced limited movement
over the previous five years and was unlikely to produce significant movement in the future. In addition, because player salaries increased so dramatically during the term of the
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, compensation levels made nearly all free agent
acquisitions a poor "trade." As an example, a club in 1987 acquiring a fifth year player
making $300,000 (today's average) would be required to forfeit its first round draft choices
for the next two years. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, at Exhibit D.
67. See NFLPA, Update '82, at I (Dec. 3, 1982) (unpublished newsletter).
68. Id.
69. See Affidavit ofJohn M. Donlan (Dec. 18, 1987) at 4.
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son schedule with teams comprised largely of so-called "replacement"
players. In all, three weekends of replacement games were played..
On October 8, 1987, the Thursday following the first weekend of
replacement games, the NFLPA in a newsletter to its members acknowledged that, "[f]or the first time, real bargaining is going on." 70 Two
days later, the NFLPA agreed to accept continuation of the right of first
refusal/compensation system (with two modifications) in exchange for
improved compensation and benefits. 7 1 Discussion of this and other
proposals, however, was quickly overtaken by the collapse of the strike
and negotiation over the Union's terms for returning to work. On October 15, just one week after the NFLPA had announced that "real bargaining" had commenced, the NFLPA ended its strike and filed suit.
Although a few negotiation sessions followed, the NFLPA's collective
bargaining positions have at all times thereafter been governed by and
subordinated to its litigation posture.
D. Announcement of the "Impasse" Standard and the Union's FailedAttempt
to Enjoin Continuation of the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
System
Shortly after filing their complaint, the Powell plaintiffs moved for an
injunction against continuation of the right of first refusal/compensation system. The NFL defendants countered with a motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the labor exemption insulated the challenged player restraints from antitrust scrutiny.
In resolving these motions, the district court announced its impasse
standard: "[T]he Court concludes that proper accommodation of labor
and antitrust interests requires that a labor exemption relating to a
mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that issue.'"72 At
the time (January 29, 1988), the district court observed that "[t]here is
abundant evidence in the record to indicate that the parties are not so
73
far apart in negotiations as this lawsuit would suggest."
Nevertheless, on the next business day, the NFLPA's antitrust counsel sent a letter to counsel for the NFL defendants declaring for the first
time that an impasse had been reached on the free agency issue and that
70.

See NFLPA, Game Plan '87, Vol. 12, No. 13, at 1 (Oct. 18, 1987) (unpublished

newsletter).
71.

SeeJanofsky, New Free-Agency Dispute, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1987, § 5, at 10, col. 1.

The NFLPA at the time described the two proposed modifications as follows:
1. That the old club's "qualifying offer" to the veteran free agent be a one-year,
guaranteed contract at a 120% increase in salary, rather than a one-year, unguaranteed contract offer as in the past; and
2. That the draft choice compensation payable to the old club for a player who
moves to a new club be based on his salary level at the time he becomes a free
agent. In the past the draft choice compensation was based on the salary
level offered by the new club.
NFLPA Press Advisory (Oct. 10, 1987) (emphasis in original).
72. See Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988) (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 789 n.22.
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defendants were therefore subject to treble damages. 74 From that date
forward, the NFLPA carefully avoided taking any steps inconsistent with
maintaining the purported impasse, and negotiations for all intents and
purposes ceased. On June 17, 1988, the district court found that the
parties were at an impasse on the free agency issue as of that date. 75
Still, one month later, the district court denied the NFLPA's motion
for injunctive relief after concluding that the parties were engaged in a
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 76
thereby depriving it of jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent
injunction. 77. In addition, the district court held that an injunction was
inappropriate under traditional equitable principles, 7 8 particularly in
light of the likely harm to the NFL were it to issue an injunction: "[T]he
potential migration of many key players from less attractive clubs to
more desirable ones could have a devastating, long-term impact on the
'79
competitive balance within the league."
E.

Announcement of a New Veteran Player Movement System and the Union's
Failed Attempt to Enjoin Its Implementation

As the 1988 season came to a close, the NFL Management Council
attempted to break the stalemate in negotiations by making two alternative bargaining proposals. 80 The first proposal, called "Plan A," contemplated significantly improved benefits and a modified right of first
refusal/compensation system with substantially revised criteria that
would foster player movement among clubs. 8 1 The second, "Plan B,"
did not offer as attractive a benefits package but incorporated an entirely
new approach to the free agency issue that would make an unprecedented number of players unconditional free agents each year. 82 The
NFLPA declined to discuss either proposal and instead submitted a
"counterproposal" so regressive that its only conceivable purpose was
83
to continue the "impasse" for litigation purposes.
No agreement having been reached as of February 1, 1989, the
Management Council exercised its undisputed labor law right at impasse
to implement new terms and conditions of employment consistent with
74. See letter from Carol Rieger, counsel for the Powell plaintiffs, to John H. Schafer,
counsel for the NFL defendants (Feb. I, 1988).
75. See Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-87-917 Hearing Tr. at 3 (D. Minn. June 17, 1988).

76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
77. See Powell v. NFL,690 F. Supp. 812, 814-17 (D.Minn. 1988).
78. Id. at 818 (citing Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C L Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113
(8th Cir. 1981)(en banc)(identifying four factors)).
79. Id.
80. Letter from Mr. Donlan to Mr. Upshaw (Nov. 16, 1988).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See NFLPA Collective Bargaining Proposal (Dec. 12, 1988) (unpublished). Under
the proposal, all veteran free agents with three or more years of service in the NFL would
become "unrestricted" free agents by 1992. In addition, the NFLPA proposed the institution of salary arbitration (at the sole discretion of the player), elimination of the option
clause from the NFL player contract, mandatory skill and injury guarantees, and significant
compensation and benefits increases. Id.
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past good faith bargaining proposals, 8 4 and implemented a modified
and even further liberalized version of Plan B. Under the revised Plan
B, each club retains rights to 37 of the approximately 55 players it has
under contract; the remainder are free to negotiate with any other club
regardless of their contractual status, the old club retaining no first refusal or compensation rights. Veteran free agents who are "protected"
by their clubs may negotiate with any other club subject to a first refusal/compensation system.
Plan B was designed to allow a large percentage of players - particularly players who had limited playing time with their present clubs an opportunity to sign with an NFL team of their own choosing while at
the same time permitting clubs to retain the players that form the nucleus of their team. In its first year of operation, Plan B was responsible
for the greatest amount of "free agent" movement in the history of professional sports; at the same time, it permitted clubs to fill gaps and add
depth to their rosters. Indeed, of the 619 players left unprotected on
February 1, 1989, 229 signed with new clubs and 149 of these players
were under contract with an NFL team as of the start of the 1989
85
season.
The NFLPA again sought injunctive relief to bar the clubs' implementation of Plan B, which was denied by the district court. Once again,
the district court found the controversy to be a "labor dispute" under
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and expressed deep concern that an injunc86
tion would irreparably harm competitive balance in the NFL.
F.

The Eighth Circuit Ruling and the NFLPA's Announcement of Plans To
Decertify

In early 1989, the Eighth Circuit granted the NFL defendants' petition for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) of the district court's ruling that the labor exemption "survives" until impasse but
not beyond. On November 1, 1989, the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling
reversing the district court.
As noted, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the challenged provisions governing veteran player movement are not subject to antitrust
challenge so long as they are the product of an ongoing collective bargaining relationship. This ruling effectively removes the first refusal/
compensation system, Plan B, and the college draft from antitrust chal84. See, e.g., Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988) (citing American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380
U.S 300, 381 (1965); Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), aff'd sub nom.
American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir.

1968)).
85. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 569 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J. dissenting).

The 229 NFL free agents who changed teams exceeded the combined total of free agent
movement in Major League Baseball and the NBA from 1982-88.

During this time, 117

baseball free agents and 93 basketball free agents changed teams. NFL Management
Council,

fore NFL Free Agents Move Than NBA, MLB Combined Total Since 1982 (Apr. 10,

1989) (unpublished news release).
86. Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 4-87-917, slip op. at 7-8 (D. Minn. Mar. 24, 1989).
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lenge at the present time. Although the Eighth Circuit identified several
options available to the parties, including the resumption of bargaining
coupled, if necessary, with the use of economic force, the NFLPA immediately announced plans to decertify and to abandon its bargaining
rights.8 7 This latest development, however, is nothing more than a negotiating ploy and another attempt to use the antitrust laws as a club at
88
the bargaining table.
Finally, on January 17, 1990, the Eighth Circuit, 7-2, denied the
NFLPA's petition for rehearing en banc. 89 The NFLPA subsequently
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court on March
12, 1990.90
III.

THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION TO
THE ANTITRUST LAWS

Prior to the Eighth Circuit ruling in Powell, two courts - the district
courts in Bridgeman and Powell - had addressed the issue of the proper
scope of the labor exemption within the context of professional sports
leagues. Although both courts recognized that the antitrust laws at
points during such disputes must give way to the labor laws, neither developed a standard which adequately accommodates labor law interests.
In Bridgeman, the district court held that "the exemption for a particular practice survives only as long as the employer continues to impose that restriction unchanged, and reasonably believes that the
practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the next collective
bargaining agreement." 9 1 Although the NFLPA urged the adoption of
this standard in Powell, the district court declined to do so on the ground
87. See Letter from Mr. Upshaw to Mr. Donlan (Nov. 6, 1989) ("The NFLPA Executive
Committee has voted to abandon bargaining rights and begin the decertification
process.").

88. The NFLPA apparently believes that, if its disclaimer of bargaining authority is
effective despite evidence to the contrary, the labor exemption ceases to protect Plan B.
This theory, however, is based on a misreading of the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Powell.
There, the court observed that Plan B had been implemented "only after [it] had been
forwarded in negotiations and subsequently rejected by Players" and that "[tihe Players
do not contend that these proposals were put forward by the League in bad faith." Powell,
888 F.2d at 569. The court then concluded that "the present lawsuit cannot be maintained
under the Sherman Act." Id. Since the Eighth Circuit issued its ruling last November,
Plan B has remained unaltered. Because Plan B was indisputably "'conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship," it should be regarded as exempt from the antitrust
laws.
89. Powell v. NFL, Civ. No. 89-5091, slip op. (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990).
90. On March 30, 1990, the NFL, the 28 member clubs, and the NFL Management
Council brought a declaratory judgment action against the NFLPA in federal district court
in Minnesota seeking a declaration, inter alia, that the NFLPA's purported decertification
and abandonment of bargaining rights is ineffective to terminate the labor exemption recognized by the Eighth Circuit. See Five Smiths, Inc. v. NFLPA, Civ. No. 3-90-177 (D. Minn.
Mar. 30, 1990).
On April 10, 1990, eight players who were protected under Plan B in 1990 brought an
antitrust action in federal district court in NewJersey alleging that the labor exemption no
longer applied and that the free agency rules as applied to them are unreasonable. See
McNeil v. NFL, Civ. No. 90-14-02-JWB (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 1990).
91. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987).
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that the Bridgeman standard fails to "give proper regard to the strong
labor law policy promoting the collective bargaining process." '9 2 The
court observed that employees, knowing that their manifestations of assent are critical to the employer's "reasonable" belief, "would have
every incentive to furnish the requisite indicia of disaffection and unwillingness to bargain."'9 3 Indeed, on the same day the Bridgeman court issued its ruling, the NBA Players Association informed NBA officials that
the players would not return to the bargaining table "until the N.B.A.
advises that it is agreeable to eliminating the right of first refusal, the
draft and the salary cap."' 94 Nevertheless, four months later, the basketball union agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement that included modified versions of all the essential features of the expired
agreement - the right of first refusal, the draft, and the salary cap despite its repeated representations to the court in Bridgeman that it
would "never" agree to the three provisions it was challenging in that
95
case.
Although the district court in Powell had correctly identified the
flaws in the Bridgeman standard, its alternate standard proved no more
successful at promoting collective bargaining. As with the basketball
union, attorneys for the NFLPA on the first business day after the "impasse" standard was announced opined that the parties had been at an
impasse on the free agency issue for some time even though no such
claim had ever previously been made. 9 6 Following counsel's advice, the
NFLPA sought to maintain this contrived impasse by breaking off negotiations and refusing to make or consider realistic offers for settlement.
This section outlines why the Eighth Circuit was correct in rejecting
the standards outlined by the district courts in Bridgeman and Powell and
in formulating its own test. Section A is an analysis of prior cases involving the labor-antitrust accommodation in analogous circumstances. Section B is a discussion of the strong labor law policy of judicial nonintervention with respect to the terms of management-labor agreements. And Section C is a critique of the Powell dissent's assertions that
unions in professional sports should be accorded benefits not enjoyed
by labor organizations in any other industry.
A.

The Primacy of the Labor Laws Relative to Pure Labor Market Restraints

Although no appellate court had previously been presented with
the precise issue in Powell, the Eighth Circuit was by no means writing on
a clean slate. Prior Supreme Court and other appellate rulings had concluded that disputes over employment terms and conditions are the cen92. Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 787 (D. Minn. 1988).
93. Id.
94. NB.A. Talks Rejected, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1987, at A14, col. 3. The NBA's first
refusal and player draft provisions are similar to those in the NFL. Unlike the NBA, however, the NFL has never had a salary cap limiting the amount individual clubs may spend
on player salaries.
95. Thomas, NB.A. and Union inAccord, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1988, at D23, col. 3.
96. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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tral focus of the labor, not the antitrust, laws. These cases establish that,
whereas the antitrust laws concern themselves primarily with anticompetitive behavior in product markets and the effects of such behavior on
consumers, the labor laws govern disputes whose only effects are on labor markets. As the Supreme Court has stated, the antitrust laws are
limited to "the prevention of restraints to free competition in business
and commercial transactions which tend[] to restrict production, raise
prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services;" ' 97 labor market restraints that restrict
competition in the setting of wages or other employment terms are not a
98
central concern of the Sherman Act.
In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters,9 the Supreme Court confirmed that the Sherman
Act has little relevance to disputes over such terms and conditions of
employment. There, the Court held that a union did not have standing
to assert antitrust claims against a multi-employer bargaining association with which it had a collective bargaining relationship. Noting that
Congress has developed "a separate body of labor laws specifically
designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities of labor unions[,]" the Court concluded that a union
"will frequently not be part of the class the Sherman Act was designed
to protect, especially in disputes with employers with whom it
bargains."' 0 0
This theme permeates the opinions of the four courts of appeal,
including the Eighth Circuit, that had previously addressed this precise
issue in analogous circumstances.' 0 ' Each of these opinions concluded
that the critical factor in determining whether the antitrust or labor laws
are to govern is the presence or absence of an effect on a product, as
opposed to a labor, market.
Most recently, in Mid-America Regional BargainingAss 'n v. Will County
CarpentersDist. Council,10 2 several members of a multi-employer bargaining association challenged a wage scale agreement between a union and
two employers that was reached after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Although the plaintiff-employers claimed that this
subsequent agreement undercut their bargaining position, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that they had failed to state an antitrust claim because the
challenged agreement resulted only in " 'the elimination of wage competition' " and was therefore covered by the labor exemption. 10 3 Observing that the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption is to protect
"the collective bargaining process," the court of appeals concluded that
"a complaint must allege conduct operating as a direct restraint upon
97. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
98. Id. at 512-13.

99. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
100. Id. at 539-40.
101. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
102. 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. Id. at 889 (citing district court opinion).
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the business market in order to avoid application of the nonstatutory
exemption ...

."104

Similarly, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union No. 576 v. Wetterau
Foods, Inc.,105 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an antitrust
action brought by a union challenging a strike-induced agreement
among employers for the loan of employees. The appellate court found
dispositive the fact that, even though the parties had bargained to an
impasse, "[tihe agreement had no anticompetitive effect unrelated to
the collective bargaining negotiations."' 10 6 In Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 10 7 the Fifth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of a suit alleging that joint employer conduct to resist union demands violated the Sherman Act: "There is no indication, however
remote, of a conspiracy or combination on the part of [the employers] to
restrain competition in the marketing of [employer] goods."' 0 8 Finally,
in Kennedy v. Long Island R.R. Co.,109 the Second Circuit held that concerted employer conduct designed to increase employer bargaining
power and having no effect on "pricing, supply, or distribution of goods
or services" is not subject to antitrust scrutiny.'1 0
The significance of the labor laws to the labor-antitrust accommodation is also made clear in a recent decision, Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n,''' that rejected an antitrust challenge to collectively-bargained
player restraints in professional basketball.' 12 Like the Seventh Circuit
in Will County Carpenters, the Second Circuit in Wood sharply distinguished the basketball labor market issue from the issue presented in
cases involving restraints that directly limit business competition in
product markets, such as Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union No. 189 v.
Jewel Tea Co. 1 13 The Second Circuit regardedJewel Tea and similar cases
104. Id. at 886 n.14, 893 (emphasis in original).
105. 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 136.
107. 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970).
108. Id. at 1007.
109. 319 F.2d 366 (2nd Cir. 1963).
110. Id. at 373; see also California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 544 (9th Cir. 1980) ("an employer agreement falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act only if it has an anticompetitive
purpose or effect on some aspect of competition other than competition over wages or
working conditions"), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Consolidated Express,
Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 514 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[rlestraints operating
on that primary [i.e., labor] market are presumptively outside the scope of the Sherman
Act"), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1134 (4th Cir. 1974) (no evidence that illegal strike "operated to
restrain commercial competition in some substantial way"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877
(1975); Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Morris. 511 F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07, 1311-12 (E.D.
Wash. 1981) (dismissing union challenge to concerted employer action as not having effects that "Congress prohibited by enacting the Sherman Act"); Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v.J.P. Stevens, 475 F. Supp. 482, 488-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (restraint upon commercial competition "an essential element of an antitrust claim"), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d
7 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 962-63.
113. 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (agreement restricting operating hours of grocery store meat
counters); see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
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as essentially irrelevant when a practice affects only the labor market:
"[T]hese cases are so clearly distinguishable that they need not detain
us. Each of the decisions involved injuries to employers who asserted that
' 1 14
they were being excluded from competition in the product market.'
In addition, while Wood involved an operative bargaining agreement, the Second Circuit's analysis accorded controlling significance to
other labor law and collective bargaining considerations: the "collective
bargaining relationship" between the NBA employers and the union;
the statutory function of the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit; and the federal labor policy promoting freedom of contract in collective bargaining."l 5 As
discussed below, these considerations are decisive because the collective
bargaining process as mandated by the labor laws will necessarily be
subverted if employment terms established through the lawful observance of that process and affecting only the bargaining parties can be
challenged under the antitrust laws.
B.

The Labor Law Policy FavoringJudicialNon-Intervention In Labor
Disputes

The federal labor laws establish the collective bargaining process as
the exclusive mechanism for the resolution of labor disputes. Most fundamentally, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") obligates both
parties to a collective bargaining relationship to bargain in good faith
with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," the so-called "mandatory subjects of collective bargaining."11 6 This duty to bargain in good faith, however, "does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession., 117 Instead, the parties are entitled to resort to certain economic
pressures, including strikes and lock-outs, in support of their position
on a mandatory subject."18
The corollary of these principles is that the government may not,
through either the NLRB or the courts, dictate or influence the substantive terms of labor-management agreements. In the leading case of H.
K. Porter v. NLRB,"19 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he object of
[the NLRA] was not to allow governmental regulation of the terms and
(1975) (contractor agreement to deal only with subcontractors which were parties to multiemployer collective bargaining agreement); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381

U.S. 657 (1965) (effect of agreement between miner's union and large coal mine operators
on small mine operators).
114. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 963 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 959-61. As noted in lWood, 809 F.2d at 958 n. 1, the author of the Second
Circuit's opinion, Judge Winter, had earlier published an oft-cited article analyzing the
application of labor-antitrust principles to employment practices in professional sports.
See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective BargainingBy Athletes: Of Superstars In
Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).

116. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d), 159(a) (1982); see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958).

117. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
118. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
119. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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conditions of employment, but rather to ensure that employers and their
employees could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions."' 20 The theory behind this freedom of contract concept is that
the parties themselves are best able to reach an agreement on12a1 wide
range of issues that will reflect their relative bargaining power.
As the Second Circuit in Wood recognized, freedom of contract is
"particularly important" in professional sports:
Such bargaining relationships raise numerous problems with
little or no precedent in standard industrial relations. As a result, leagues and player unions may reach seemingly unfamiliar
or strange agreements. If courts were to intrude and to outlaw
such solutions, leagues and their player unions would have to
arrange their affairs in a less efficient way. It would also inreducing the number and qualcrease the chances of strikes by
12 2
ity of possible compromises.
The importance of this principle is demonstrated by the implications of a court accepting jurisdiction of antitrust claims such as those
asserted by the Powell plaintiffs. Because an antitrust court is expressly
forbidden from imposing specific terms on parties to a collective bargaining relationship, the only possible motivation for bringing such a
suit is to gain leverage in negotiations. In these circumstances, any
court judgment would necessarily have a significant effect on any ultimate agreement in a manner not contemplated or authorized by the labor laws.
Accordingly, in another case involving a professional sports league,
McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. ,123 the Sixth Circuit held that the district
court had improperly asserted itself in a collective bargaining dispute in
the National Hockey League ("NHL"). There, the district court had
found dispositive the NHL's successful insistence on the inclusion of a
player reservation system described by the district court as a " 'modified
Rozelle Rule.' ",124 The court of appeals, however, held that the labor
exemption applied because "nothing in the labor laws compels either
party negotiating over mandatory subjects of collective bargaining to
12 5
yield on its initial bargaining position."'
Indeed, judicial scrutiny under the rule of reason of collectively-bargained terms, or proposed substitute terms, could produce anomalous
results wholly unintended by the framers of either the labor or antitrust
laws. As a preliminary matter, were a court to find that a disputed term
120. Id. at 103. See also Local 24, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295
(1959).
121. See, e.g. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 150 n. 11 (1976) (citing NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960)); see also Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954,
961 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[c]ourts cannot hope to fashion contract terms more efficient than
those arrived at by the parties who are to be governed by them").
122. Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
123. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
124. Id. at 1194 (quoting district court).
125. Id. at 1200.
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constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, the forbidden term would
continue to be a mandatory subject of bargaining capable of being proposed by the employer as part of an overall agreement and accepted by
the union. That is precisely the situation in the NFL where the union
has in the past accepted labor market "restraints" in collective bargaining because management guaranteed a total financial benefits package
for a period of years. The question then arises whether union acceptance bears on the "reasonableness" of the challenged restraint if it is
thereafter maintained as the status quo during a continuing labor dispute.
If so, the antitrust inquiry will cover an unusual range of subjects; if not,
the inappropriateness of applying the antitrust laws to collective bargaining matters is made plain. Similarly, it is not clear by what standard
finders of fact will measure the "reasonableness" of an employment restraint when the matters presented for resolution as antitrust issues
cover only limited aspects of the overall employer-employee relationship. 126 In short, if every solution proposed in collective bargaining to
resolve a disputed employment issue must also periodically satisfy the
antitrust rule of reason, freedom of contract in collective bargaining in
professional sports will effectively be destroyed.
C.

The Options Available to Associations of ProfessionalAthletes Under The
Labor Laws

The predominant theme of the dissent in Powell is that, absent the
"antitrust lever," 127 the only realistic option for the NFLPA is "decertification" and "abandonment of bargaining rights."' 2 8 The dissent complains that the majority opinion provides the League with a labor
exemption of "indefinite" duration and therefore leaves the NFL mem129
ber clubs with no incentive to negotiate a new agreement.
In support of its position, the dissent relies heavily on Mr. Lock's
Duke Law Journalarticle. In that article, Mr. Lock concludes that special
rules are needed to protect professional athletes, or at least NFL players, because of an alleged "significant mismatch" in bargaining
power. 13 0 To "reduce the imbalance in bargaining leverage in the
NFL," 1 Mr. Lock proposes that the labor exemption expire with the
collective bargaining agreement - a position specifically rejected by
126.

Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801

(1977).
127. See Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559, 571 (8th Cir. 1989) (HeaneyJ. dissenting); see
Lock, supra note 17, at 341. As the majority observed, however, in discussing the
dissent's argument "that the court's action deprives the Union of the threat of antitrust
laws, 'the antitrust lever' and removes this issue from the bargaining table," such removal
"is precisely the thrust of nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws." See Powell,

also

888 F.2d at 568 n.l1.
128.

Id. at 570 (Heaney, J. dissenting).

129. Id. Dismissing the majority's suggestion that the NFLPA can use economic force
to attempt to eliminate or modify the challenged player restraints, the dissent responds,
"should players be forced to strike to alter owner conduct which violates the antitrust
laws? I think not." Id.
130. See Lock, supra note 17, at 397-419.
131. Id. at 404.
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every judge to have considered it, including the Powell dissenter.'
Mr. Lock, however, does not stop there. Not content merely with a
rule which would expose professional sports leagues, or at least the
NFL, to treble damage suits with respect to collectively bargained employment terms at the moment of contract expiration, Mr. Lock suggests
repeal of decades-old antitrust exemptions that permit the NFL member
clubs to pool their revenues from national television contracts' 3 3 and
that allowed the NFL to merge 13 4 with the American Football League
("AFL"). 135 Finally, Mr. Lock proposes amendments to the NLRA that
would apply only to the professional sports industry, including expanded use of injunctive relief and expedited unfair labor practice
36
proceedings. 1
As an initial matter, Mr. Lock's thesis proceeds from the erroneous
factual premise that the NFLPA has always been and always will be bargaining from a position of weakness in negotiations with the NFL member clubs. Mr. Lock even asserts that the NFLPA had been "dominated"
in 1982; 137 as noted, however, the Union in 1982 had successfully
staged a fifty-seven day strike seeking a fixed percentage of gross revenues after which it had unequivocally proclaimed victory citing a guaranteed compensation package of $1.2 billion over five years. 13 8 Even
today, Mr. Garvey, who led the NFLPA during those negotiations, notes
the strength of a union that in 1982 "was one week from [forcing the]
cancellation" of the entire season. 139 Moreover, Mr. Lock concedes that
"management suffered significant losses during past players' strikes."1 40
Therefore, even if one makes the unwarranted assumption that one purpose of the labor laws should be to strengthen weak unions, 141 it is clear
that the NFLPA - despite the annual turnover in its membership and
the differing priorities of superstar and journeyman players 14 2 - is per-

132. See supra note 34.

133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
134. Id.
135. See Lock, supra note 17, at 403-08. Mr. Lock's proposed wholesale revisions to the
antitrust laws have been raised in other cases involving the NFL and rejected. In the USFL
litigation, for example, the district court expressly "decline[d] to undo the congressionally
authorized merger of the NFL and the AFL." See USFL v. NFL, 84 Civ. 7484 (PKL), slip
op. at 21 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986). Moreover, Mr. Lock has ignored the circumstances
surrounding the merger, most notably the strong concern voiced by legislators that the
merger would lead to franchise stability and expansion. See, e.g., ProfessionalFootball League
Merger: Hearings on S. 3817 Before The Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Similarly, as noted, the pooling of television and other revenues is essential if clubs in smaller markets are to compete on the playing field with those
based in media centers. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
136. Lock, supra note 17, at 409-15.
137. Id. at 359.
138. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
139. See Garvey, supra note 11, at 336.
140. See Lock, supra note 17, at 403.
141. Such a purpose is clearly not contemplated by the labor laws. As the Supreme
Court has observed, the NLRA "does not contemplate that unions will always be secure
and able to achieve agreement even when their economic position is weak, or that strike
and lockouts will never result from a bargaining impasse." H.K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99, 109 (1970).
142. Lock, supra note 17, at 354-59.
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fectly capable of uniting its players behind an issue of concern to the
majority of its membership.
More fundamentally, however, Mr. Lock operates from an assumption completely at odds with long-settled labor law principles, most notably freedom of contract. In one telling passage, Mr. Lock complains
that "[n]one of the [NFLPA's] strikes forced management to capitulate
to the union."1 4 3 In another, he concedes that "[clertainly, judicial condemnation of the challenged restraints may benefit the union at the bargaining table; it has the potential to shape the terms of the
agreement." 144 Consistent with this theme, Mr. Lock recommends a solution that would stand the principle of freedom of contract on its head:
"The Minnesota district court should outline the type of system regulat14 5
ing free agency that might satisfy the rule of reason."
From these statements and others, it seems that Mr. Lock believes
that the NFL member clubs are compelled to reach agreement with the
NFLPA on the Union's terms. Apparently recognizing that this view
conflicts with labor law prohibitions against governmental intrusion into
the contract formation process, Mr. Lock attempts to overcome this
roadblock by asserting that the freedom of contract principle should be
suspended in this case because the NFL member clubs have "been inconsistent with [their] obligation [to act in good faith]." 146 The NFLPA,
however, has never made, much less proven, such an allegation.
In any event, Mr. Lock, having concluded that freedom of contract
principles are no barrier, states that the antitrust laws are an appropriate
means ofjudicial intervention in the NFL's labor dispute. Mr. Lock then
seeks to avoid application of the labor exemption by stating that its purpose is to protect unions and that an employer's protection is merely
"derivative." 147 No case, however, has ever held that the labor exemption exists only to serve union/employee interests and that union agreement is essential to the exemption. To the contrary, courts have
expressly acknowledged that employers are entitled to assert the exemption.1 48 Indeed, the clear purpose of the labor exemption is not to protect one party or the other, but rather to "preserve the integrity of the
negotiating process." 149
Now that the integrity of the process has in fact been preserved by
the Eighth Circuit ruling, the parties have the option of returning to the
143. Id. at 396.
144. Id. at 386.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id. at 384. Mr. Garvey makes the same allegation in his foreword to Mr. Lock's
article. Garvey, supra note 11, at 337.
147. Lock, supra note 17, at 353.
148. See, e.g., Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n. 14 (3d Cir.
1974) (unavailability of labor exemption to employers "would undermine the vitality of
the exemption by discouraging bargaining on the part of management") (citing Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499
(E.D. Pa. 1972)); see
also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 612 n.10 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing
Scooper Dooper).

149. Scooper Dooper, 494 F.2d at 847 n.14 (emphasis added).
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bargaining table to negotiate free of the distractions spawned by the
Powell litigation. If collective bargaining is not initially successful, either
party may employ the powerful economic weapons sanctioned by the
labor laws. If these rules are not followed, remedies enforcing compliance are available at the NLRB.
The labor laws have provided the framework for successful resolutions to disputes in virtually every other industry 150 - as well as in major league baseball. Not that agreements always result or that success is
always immediate. Agreements have on occasion come only after
15
months and sometimes years of negotiation and sometimes not at all. '
In all instances, however, federal labor policy dictates that the ultimate
resolution be left to the parties. There being no authority or reason for
a special rule for professional athletes, the NFLPA should return to the
bargaining table to resume a process that was abruptly halted in midstream more than two and a half years ago.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NFL's current labor dispute has serious implications for the
League's future. At the moment, the NFL is enjoying great popularity
- attendance is high; television ratings are strong; international interest
is increasing; and expansion is on the horizon. The NFL's success, however, has not left the players behind' 52 - expansion over the years has
created additional job opportunities and salaries have reached levels
never before contemplated.
The NFL's success is no accident. It is the product of years of sacrifice and compromise. Typical of the League's philosophy was the agreement made in the beginning by clubs from the larger markets to share
their revenues with teams from smaller cities. Later, the clubs agreed to
allocate the best players among themselves on an even basis and not
simply to the highest bidder. These policies reflect the recognition of
the member clubs that the interests of all connected with the NFL are in
staging close, exciting games and tight races for the championship.
While the League's current system does not guarantee that each club
will enjoy the same level of success, it does provide roughly equal
opportunities.
The NFL's commitment to these principles is as strong as ever, but
150. Indeed, in most labor disputes, the disagreement is between a union and a single
employer. It is only because of the fortuity of the League's organizational scheme in which
the NFL's 28 member clubs employ their players directly, as opposed to through the
League, that an action alleging violations of section one of the Sherman Act may even be
brought.
151. As the Supreme Court stated in H.K. Porter, "[Congress] recognized from the beginning that agreement might in some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that
the Government would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement." 397 U.S. at 103-04.
152. If anything, the opposite is true as increasing costs are rapidly outpacing revenue
growth. See, e.g., Hayes, The NFL's Painful Profit Crunch, N.Y. Tiies, Oct. 29, 1989, § 3, at
I, col. 4; Robichaux, Dallas Cowboys Face Financial Predicament Spreading in the NFL, Wall St.
J., Oct. 23, 1989, at AI, col. 1.
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the League has over the years attempted to accommodate the players'
legitimate interests as expressed in collective bargaining. The result has
been higher salaries, improved benefits, and, with Plan B, greater opportunity for movement. Nevertheless, the NFLPA now insists on a
condition - complete free agency for all players at some point in their
career - that the member clubs believe threatens both the interests of
the majority of players and the long-term integrity of the League.
The ultimate question raised by the Powell litigation, therefore, is
whether the participants or the courts should resolve this dispute. The
Eighth Circuit's response is plainly correct; courts are ill-equipped to
deal with the complexity of issues presented by collective bargaining
agreements in professional sports. More fundamentally, the labor laws
strictly forbid them from doing so.

